


Reachability Analysis: State of the Art for Various System Classes

Matthias Althoff

Carnegie Mellon University


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Safety Verification Using Reachable Sets



- System is safe if no trajectory enters the unsafe set.

Safety Verification Using Reachable Sets



- System is safe if no trajectory enters the unsafe set.
- Overapproximated system is safe \rightarrow real system is safe.
- Challenge: Compute tight overapproximations while avoiding the curse of dimensionality.

Overview of Important System Classes

For all system classes we consider

- uncertain initial states $x(0) \in \mathcal{X}$,
- uncertain inputs $u(t) \in \mathcal{U}$,
- finite or infinite time horizons (search for invariant set).


System class	Dynamics	Cont. var. (best case)	Challenge
linear time invariant (LTI)	$\dot{x} = Ax(t) + Bu(t)$	1000	none
LTI with unc. parameters	$\dot{x} = Ax(t) + Bu(t)$, $A \in \mathcal{A}$	100	parameter dependencies
nonlinear	$\dot{x} = f(x(t), u(t), p)$, p : parameter vector	100	linearization errors
hybrid	hybrid automaton	100	guard intersection

Linear Time Invariant (LTI) Systems


Work of Colas Le Guernic and Antoine Girard (2006).

$$\dot{x} = Ax(t) + Bu(t), \quad x(0) \in X_0, u(t) \in U$$

- Scalable ($\mathcal{O}(n^3)$; n : nr of cont. state variables) when using zonotopes or support functions as set representation. More than 1000 state variables in a few minutes.
- First wrapping-free algorithm for LTI-Systems; wrapping-effect: propagation of overapproximations through successive time steps.



with wrapping effect



without wrapping effect

Linear Systems with Uncertain Parameters



System matrix A is uncertain in a set of matrices \mathcal{A} .

$$\dot{x} = A(t)x(t) + Bu(t), \quad x(0) \in X_0, \quad u(t) \in U, \quad A(t) \in \mathcal{A} \subset \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}$$

- Different algorithms for constant and time varying system matrix A .
- No wrapping-free implementation exists.
- Scalable ($\mathcal{O}(n^3)$) when using zonotopes as set representation.
- How to represent uncertainty in parameters?
 - Interval matrices $\mathcal{A} = [\underline{A}, \overline{A}]$,
 - matrix zonotopes $\mathcal{A} = \{C + \sum_{i=1}^{\kappa} \beta_i G_i \mid \beta_i \in [-1, 1], C, G_i \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}\}$,
 - matrix polytopes $\mathcal{A} = \{\sum_{i=1}^{\kappa} \alpha_i V_i \mid V_i \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}, \alpha_i \geq 0, \sum_i \alpha_i = 1\}$.

RLC circuit

Example: RLC circuit with 40 states.





Nonlinear Systems with Uncertain Parameters

General continuous dynamics described by a Lipschitz continuous function:

$$\dot{x} = f(x(t), u(t), p(t)), \quad x(0) \in X_0, u(t) \in U, p(t) \in \mathcal{P} \subset \mathbb{R}^p$$

- Approach is based on linearizing the system dynamics while adding the linearization errors as an additional uncertain input.
- Scalable when using zonotopes.
- Two examples:
 - Rollover verification of a truck.
 - Online verification of autonomous car maneuvers.

Sketch of the Truck



Truck Dynamics


$$\begin{aligned}
m v(\dot{\beta} + \dot{\psi}) - m_S h \ddot{\Phi} &= Y_{\beta} \beta + Y_{\dot{\psi}}(v) \dot{\psi} + Y_{\delta} \delta \\
-l_{xz} \ddot{\Phi} + l_{zz} \ddot{\psi} &= N_{\beta} \beta + N_{\dot{\psi}}(v) \dot{\psi} + N_{\delta} \delta \\
(l_{xx} + m_S h^2) \ddot{\Phi} - l_{xz} \ddot{\psi} &= m_S g h \Phi + m_S v h (\dot{\beta} + \dot{\psi}) - k_f (\Phi - \Phi_{t,f}) \\
&\quad - b_f (\dot{\Phi} - \dot{\Phi}_{t,f}) - k_r (\Phi - \Phi_{t,r}) - b_r (\dot{\Phi} - \dot{\Phi}_{t,r}) \\
-r(Y_{\beta,f} \beta + Y_{\dot{\psi},f} \dot{\psi} + Y_{\delta} \delta) &= m_{u,f} v (r - h_{u,f}) (\dot{\beta} + \dot{\psi}) + m_{u,f} g h_{u,f} \Phi_{t,f} \\
&\quad - k_{t,f} \Phi_{t,f} + k_f (\Phi - \Phi_{t,f}) + b_f (\dot{\Phi} - \dot{\Phi}_{t,f}) \\
-r(Y_{\beta,r} \beta + Y_{\dot{\psi},r} \dot{\psi}) &= m_{u,r} v (r - h_{u,r}) (\dot{\beta} + \dot{\psi}) - m_{u,r} g h_{u,r} \Phi_{t,r} \\
&\quad - k_{t,r} \Phi_{t,r} + k_r (\Phi - \Phi_{t,r}) + b_r (\dot{\Phi} - \dot{\Phi}_{t,r}) \\
\dot{v} &= a_x.
\end{aligned}$$

yaw controller:


$$\delta = k_1 e + k_2 \int e(t) dt, \quad e = \dot{\psi}_d - \dot{\psi}.$$

$v \in$	$[10, 20]$ m/s	$[20, 30]$ m/s	$[30, \infty[$ m/s
controller gains	$k_1 = 0.4$ $k_2 = 1.5$	$k_1 = 0.5$ $k_2 = 2$	$k_1 = 0.6$ $k_2 = 2.5$

Reachable Set of the Truck



Online Verification Of Autonomous Cars




Autonomous vehicles cannot perfectly follow planned trajectories due to

- uncertain initial states,
- uncertain measurements,
- disturbances.


Consequence: Planned maneuver is safe under perfect conditions, but may become unsafe due to uncertainties.

Verification Of Evasive Maneuver

Evasive maneuver due to a pedestrian stepping on the road:




Road Occupancy after reachable set computation:



Computation time in MATLAB on an Intel i7 Processor with 1.6 GHz in 2.24 s \rightarrow Around 2 times faster than maneuver time (5 s).

Hybrid Systems


Graphical Description:



- In addition to continuous systems, the intersection with guard sets is required.
- Example: Reachability analysis of a powertrain (up to 100 cont. variables).



Model of the Powertrain

Powertrain with arbitrary number of rotating masses:



The system is hybrid due to the consideration of backlash.

Reachable Set of the Powertrain



Computation times in seconds:

dim. n	11	21	31	41	51	101
CPU time	7.327	21.96	36.84	120.2	318.8	10079
1 st guard	0.247	3.454	11.99	49.36	145.8	4609
2 nd guard	0.259	3.494	12.61	51.57	148.1	4975

Conclusions and Discussion

Conclusions:

- For all considered system classes (linear, nonlinear, hybrid) new techniques make it possible to consider systems beyond academic examples.
- However: Typical industry systems with several hundred state variables and complex dynamics (hybrid with nonlinear cont. dynamics) are still out of reach.

Discussion to further improve scalability:

- Consider verification in the design process:
 - What are subsystems and sub-specifications of the whole system?
 - Can the system design be slightly changed to the advantage of a much simpler verification?
- Can simple models represent complex models when adding uncertainty?